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United in diversity? Europarties and their individual members’ rights 
 
Isabelle Hertner  
Abstract 
At a time when most national parties in Europe are losing members, parties at the European 
level, or Europarties, have introduced membership for individuals. This article is the first to 
investigate, compare, and explain the individual membership of Europarties. It focuses on the 
rights of the individual members to participate in the formulation of policies and the selection 
of leadership candidates. For this purpose, the article develops an index that charts the 
participatory rights. In doing so, it highlights a high degree of variation between the 
Europarties. It argues that these differences can be explained through a combination of four 
factors: the Europarties’ electoral successes; the attitudes of the national member parties 
towards individual membership; the motivation and activism of the individual members; and 
Europarty funding rules. The article argues that if Europarties want to be seen as ‘real’ 
parties, they should grant their grassroots members real participatory powers. 
 
Keywords: Europarties, European People’s Party, Party of European Socialists, European 
Green Party, Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, Party of the European Left, 
individual party members. 
  
1. Introduction 
In its guidebook for political work, the Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
(ALDE) notes: ‘Membership is everything! Members are your activists, candidates, 
councillors, MPs and MEPs. Members also do most of the fundraising and campaigning’ 
(ELDR 2011, 47). Yet, across Europe, national political parties have experienced a decline in 
their membership levels, both in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the electorate (van 
Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2012; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000). Interestingly, however, the 
loss of membership has gone hand in hand with the empowerment of the remaining members. 
Indeed, many parties have recently sought to re-engage with their members by giving them 
new political rights, such as the power to help select candidates, leaders, and policies. This 
re-engagement has led to a growing scholarly interest in national parties’ mass membership. 
By contrast, the fact that parties at the European level, or Europarties, have introduced 
individual membership schemes in the past decade has gone almost unnoticed in the 
academic literature. This is perhaps unsurprising. After all, Europarties have traditionally 
been described as ‘parties of parties’ that were dominated by their member parties 
(Bressanelli 2013; Johansson 2009). Until recently, membership was indeed restricted to 
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national parties and a few affiliated associations and organizations, while natural persons had 
no opportunity to join Europarties directly.  
The fact that Europarties now offer individual membership is an important 
development. It has the potential to alter the linkages between citizens and the European 
Union. Europarties increasingly form bridges between politicians in the three main EU 
institutions, and they have the potential to influence the EU’s decision-making process (van 
Hecke 2010; Chryssogelos 2017). Moreover, at a time when the gap between the European 
Union’s citizens and its political elites appears to be widening (Raunio and Mattila 2012) 
Europarties could constitute an obvious potential democratic link between Brussels and the 
concerns of ordinary voters (Bardi et al. 2014; Katsanidou and Lefkofridi 2014). Yet, what 
rights do Europarties offer their individual members? This matters in the long term. Research 
shows that the majority of national party members want more than just a membership card. 
They value having influence over party policy (Scarrow 2015, 197).  
This article is the first to investigate, compare, and explain the individual membership 
schemes of the Europarties. In doing so, it is guided by the logic of ‘discovery’, towards 
gaining new insights about a political development (Diesing 1971). The purpose of this 
research is thereby twofold. It first describes the powers that were given to the Europarties’ 
individual members. Second, it develops an index that charts these powers. In this study, all 
of the 16 currently registered Europarties were originally considered (see table 1 below). It 
draws on the Europarties’ statutes, rulebooks, and websites. In addition, a number of semi-
structures interviews were conducted with Europarty officials and a few key individual 
members in an effort to collect otherwise inaccessible data and understand the politics behind 
the scenes.1 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The next section provides a brief 
overview of the Europarties’ historical development. This is followed by a discussion of the 
participatory rights of national party members - the only kind of party membership that has 
been widely debated and conceptualized in the academic literature.  The fourth section first 
describes the participatory rights that the Europarties have given their individual members 
and then introduces an index that can be used to measure and compare these rights. It reveals 
                                                
1 Eleven semi-structured interviews with officials from seven Europarties were conducted between 2011 and 
2017. In addition, seven semi-structured interviews were conducted between 2014 and 2016 with individual 
members from ALDE, the EGP, and the PES. These members held key positions inside the members’ networks. 
As requested by the interviewees, all interviews have been anonymized. They are listed in the references in 
alphabetical order.  
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a high degree of variation between the Europarties. This variation is explained using four 
factors: the electoral successes of the Europarties in recent European Parliamentary elections; 
the attitudes of the national member parties towards individual membership; the activities and 
motivations of the individual members; and Europarty funding regulations. Finally, in the 
concluding discussion it is argued that if Europarties are serious in their attempt to become 
grassroots organizations, they should offer their members stronger participatory rights. 
 
HERE: Table 1: List of registered Europarties (2018) 
 
 
2. Europarties: History and Organization 
The term ‘Europarty’ refers to the transnational, extra-parliamentary federations of national 
political parties from several EU member states, united by political affinity. These 
organizations are not identical with the political groups in the European Parliament (EP), 
although they closely cooperate with each other. The oldest and most established Europarties, 
the European People’s Party (EPP), the Party of European Socialists (PES), and the Alliance 
of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) were formed in the run-up to the first direct 
elections of the European Parliament in the mid-1970s (van Hecke 2010, 400). The European 
Federation of Green Parties was founded in 1993.2  After years of lobbying for legal 
recognition (Raunio and Johansson 2005), Europarties gained legal status in 2003. Since 
then, they have disposed of their own funds, which come out of the European Parliament’s 
budget and the fees paid by their national member parties.3 The increased budget triggered a 
professionalization of the Europarties’ infrastructure, personnel and communication (Jansen 
and van Hecke, 2011: 201). In 2008, the regulation was amended to allow Europarties to use 
their funds for campaigning during European Parliamentary elections.4  Six years later, in 
2014, another EU regulation was ratified that imposed new rules aiming to make party 
                                                
2 In 2004 it changed its name to European Green Party.  
3 Regulation (EC) No. 2004/2003 of the European Parliament and the Council of 4 November 2003 on the 
regulations governing political parties at the European level and the rules regarding their funding, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L297/1-4, 15 November 2003. 
4 Regulation (EC) No. 1524/2007 of the European Parliament and the council of 18 December 2007 amending 
Regulation (EC) No. 2004/2003 on the regulations governing political parties at European level and the rules 
regarding their funding, Official Journal of the European Union, L343/5-8, 27 December 2007. 
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funding and decision-making structures more transparent.5 Thus, within a timeframe of 
eleven years, the statutes and activities of Europarties have become much more regulated. At 
the time of writing, further legislation on Europarty funding and registration was in the 
making.  
Since the early 2000s, a number of new Europarties have been launched, such as the 
Party of the European Left (EL) and the European Democratic Party (EDP) in 2004; and the 
Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe (ACRE) and the Alliance of European 
National Movements (AENM) in 2009. More recently - between 2010 and 2015 - five new 
Europarties were founded, all of which are deeply Eurosceptic: the Alliance for Direct 
Democracy in Europe (ADDE), the Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF), the Coalition for 
Life and Family (CLF), the European Alliance for Freedom (EAF) and the Movement for a 
Europe of Nations and Freedom (MENF).   
There still exists an enormous degree of variation between the older Europarties and 
those that were launched most recently. The older Europarties, such as the EPP, PES, ALDE 
and EGP, act like extra-parliamentary parties: they coordinate member party policy positions 
and shape policy agendas at the EU level (Timuş and Lightfoot 2014). In terms of their 
corporate membership, these Europarties distinguish between full member parties (mainly 
from EU member states, though some parties allow parties from outside the EU to become 
full members), associate parties, and observer parties. Their most influential actors are the 
full member parties whose delegates have the right to vote at the Europarty congress (which 
is the highest decision-making body) and to participate in high-level working groups together 
with Europarty officials. Here, many important strategic decisions are taken about the day-to-
day workings of the party, from planning campaigns to discussing policies. In contrast, the 
most recently created Europarties are very loosely organized federations with lower budgets, 
few (or no) member parties, and a smaller number of seats in the European Parliament. They 
are led by individual politicians rather than by national parties.6 Thus, if the older Europarties 
                                                
5 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1141/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 
on the statute and funding of European political parties and European political foundations, Official Journal of 
the European Union, L317/1, 4 November 2014. 
6 When the new Europarty regulation mentioned is ratified, individuals will no longer be able to set up a 
Europarty – only national parties will be able to do so. The aim is to avoid individual members of a national 
party participating in the formation of more than one Europarty in order to maximise access to public funds 
(European Parliament, 27/02/2018).  
 
5	  
	  
are ‘parties of parties’, then those founded in 2010 and after could be described as ‘parties of 
a small number of individual politicians’.  
Despite such elitist structures, 13 out of 16 Europarties currently allow natural 
persons to join. The existing Europarty regulations are vague on individual membership, 
which gives parties the freedom to decide how far they want to go. The 2014 regulation 
merely obliges Europarties to include ‘the rights and duties associated with all types of 
membership and the relevant voting rights’ into their statutes. Whether or not they let natural 
persons join, and under what conditions, is their decision. The older Europarties had to 
change their rulebooks when they introduced individual membership, a decision that their 
(full) member parties had to ratify. 
The largest Europarty, the EPP, was the first to introduce ‘supporting membership’ in 
1990 in an attempt to create ‘a real party with members’ (EPP 1, interview with author). 
However, the party still only has a few hundred supporting members. The EPP offers ‘direct’ 
membership to individuals, which means that anyone signing up to their values (and who 
isn’t already a member of a rival party) can join as a supporting member for € 20 per annum. 
Supporting members are sometimes invited to attend working group meetings, but this is not 
a formal right. The supporting members themselves do not organize any events or election 
campaigns, and they do not have a designated website or social network presence. Overall, 
the EPP sees supporting membership as ‘primarily a symbolic membership’ (EPP 2, 
interview with author).  
In 2004, the European Green Party (EGP) was the second Europarty to introduce 
individual membership (‘individual supporters’). The ‘Individual Supporters Network’ (ISN) 
was originally set up in 2002 by grassroots members of the green parties of Belgium, 
Germany, and the Netherlands. However, it took until 2009 for the ISN to become a formal 
coordination structure. In March 2014, the EGP had 1051 individual supporters. In contrast to 
the EPP, the EGP only offers ‘indirect’ membership, as all individual supporters have to be 
members of national green parties. The EGP charges an annual membership fee of  € 24 per 
annum, which the members pay in addition to national party fees. In addition, the European 
Greens have introduced the notion of ‘friends’: anyone can become a friend of the EGP 
without being charged. The number of friends is slowly rising whilst the number of members 
appears to be stagnating.  
The second largest Europarty, the PES, had introduced a type of individual 
membership during the 1990s, which, however, failed to take off because of a lack of funding 
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and official recognition (Day and Shaw 2006, 113). The party re-introduced individual 
membership, the ‘PES activists’, in 2005 under the leadership of president Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen. He described the PES activists as ‘the bridge builders between the national and 
the European scenes (Rasmussen 2009). All members of the PES’s member parties are 
automatically members of the PES, but have to register online. Hence, like the Greens, the 
Socialists only offer ‘indirect’ individual membership to the members of their national 
member parties. About 200 city groups had been launched by PES activists across Europe, 
involving about 30,000 registered activists.  
The centrist European Democratic Party introduced the possibility for individuals to 
join directly when the party was launched in 2004. However, in practice, individual 
membership has not been implemented. The EDP’s executive manager explained that the 
party sees itself primarily as ‘an association of national parties’, and that the EDF was 
currently lacking the organizational structures to manage and promote individual membership 
(EDP 1, interview with author).  
In 2007, the three-year old Party of the European Left (EL) also decided to introduce 
individual membership ‘as a contribution to its future development’ (Party of the European 
Left 2013). Individuals can register with the EL directly, without having to pay a fee. In 
countries where the EL has member parties (or affiliated political organizations) these can 
decide whether and how to integrate the EL’s individual members. However, membership is 
also open to individuals in countries where the EL has no member parties. In April 2017, the 
EL had 600 individual members.  
The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe only introduced individual 
membership in 2011. Former ALDE Secretary General Federica Sabbati said: ‘the launch of 
Associate Membership for individuals is another step in the continuing development of the 
ELDR Party from a network of liberal parties into a fully-fledged European political party’ 
(ALDE 2014).7 Like the EPP, ALDE offers ‘direct’ membership to anyone signing up to its 
values who isn’t already a member of a rival party. Today, many members come from 
countries where ALDE has no member party. ALDE wanted to give these individuals an 
‘ideological home’ (ALDE 1, interview with author). ALDE had approximately 5670 
individual members in 2017. 
                                                
7 ALDE was called ELDR (European Liberal Democrat and Reform Party) before changing their name in 
November 2012.	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The youngest Europarties also deal with individual membership in different ways. For 
a start, there are four new Europarties that do not allow natural persons to join them. These 
are: the Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe (ACRE), the European Christian 
Political Movement (ECPM), the European Free Alliance (EFA), and the Alliance for Peace 
and Freedom (APF). Their individual membership schemes target elected politicians only. 
ACRE’s chief executive explained in an interview that the party was ‘focusing on 
establishing itself as a political force in Brussels, not as a grassroots movement’ (ACRE 1, 
interview with author). 
Meanwhile, Europeans United for Democracy (EUD) allows natural persons to join 
directly, but in practice, all individual members appear to be elected politicians. 
Unsurprisingly, the two Europarties that do not have a single member party allow individuals 
to join directly. The Coalition for Life and Family (CLF), for instance, accepts individuals for 
an annual fee of less than €150. In theory, the European Alliance for Freedom (EAF) also 
allows natural persons to join, but in practice, all individual members are elected politicians, 
and they are asked to pay £1500 per annum. They have voting rights at the EAF’s Congress, 
as would be expected: after all, they are the only party members.  
The APF allows individuals to join as ‘supporting members’ for € 60 a year, but 
provides no further information. Meanwhile, the Movement for a Europe of Nations and 
Freedom (MENF), the Alliance of European National Movements (AENM), and the Alliance 
for Direct Democracy in Europe (ADDE) do not make their rulebooks or any other 
information about individual membership publicly available. At the time of writing, ADDE 
was also under investigation for misusing EU funds (Heath 04/04/2017) and its website was 
defunct. It is therefore fair to say that these Europarties are paper entities without permanent 
structures and without grassroots members. Table 2 provides an overview of the Europarties’ 
individual membership schemes. It only lists those five Europarties that have implemented 
membership for natural persons and have made the data available. In order to put Europarty 
membership into context, the next section will focus on national party members and their 
rights. 
 
HERE: Table 2: Overview of all Europarties and their individual membership schemes 
(2018) 
 
3. National party members and their participatory rights 
Party members and activists were once described as the ‘Cinderellas’ of national politics, 
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neglected by scholars because they were perceived as unpopular and unrepresentative of 
society (Whiteley and Seyd 1992, 1). Much has changed in the meantime. Paradoxically, as 
parties have lost members, scholars have researched the members’ roles, profiles and 
attitudes in much greater detail (Webb, Poletti and Bale 2017; van Haute and Gauja 2015; 
Scarrow 2015; Young 2013; Whiteley 2011; Scarrow and Gezgor 2010; Scarrow 1994a, 
1994b). In the most comprehensive study of party members, Scarrow (2015) reveals that 
national parties have such diverse notions of membership that it is almost impossible to 
define what a party member is. Recently, national parties have responded to the decline in 
‘traditional’ membership by introducing new, looser categories of affiliation, thereby 
becoming ‘multi-speed parties’. Another response to the decline in membership has also been 
a trend for parties to adopt more internal democracy, ‘a trend that transfers new powers to 
individual party members’ (Scarrow and Gezgor 2010, 826). Thus, most internally 
democratic parties let their members participate in the selection of candidates for public 
office and the party leadership, and the formulation of policy (Rahat and Shapira 2017). In 
practice, candidate selection methods differ enormously between parties (Hazan and Rahat 
2010). Traditionally, most national parties in Europe have selected their candidates by a 
relatively exclusive selectorate, consisting of party delegates and élites. In recent years, 
however, a number of national parties across Europe have adopted more inclusive models to 
select their leaders by holding open or closed primaries (Cross 2013; Gauja 2013a; Scarrow, 
Webb and Farrell 2000).  
When it comes to party members’ participation in programmatic decisions, the 
situation is equally diverse. Gauja (2013a, 117) identifies four different types of membership 
participation in the formulation of party policy, each of which could also apply to 
Europarties. First, direct participation means that individual members can directly participate 
in policy working groups and/or cast their votes directly in referendums. Second and third, 
there is participation through delegation and representation, where party members choose 
peers to represent their views and interests at a higher level of decision-making, such as party 
conferences. This is the most common type of participation within national political parties. 
Fourth, some parties offer their members participation in the policy-making process by 
holding policy consultations, forums or conventions where members can feed in their ideas. 
Although some parties and party families emphasize one type of participation over another, 
the different types of participation often co-exist within one party (Poguntke, Scarrow and 
Webb 2016; Gauja 2013b, 122). If Europarties want to be seen as ‘real’ parties, they should 
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follow the examples of national parties and let their grassroots members participate in the 
selection of leaders and the formulation of policy.  
 
4. Europarties’ individual members and their participatory rights 
This section reveals the extent to which Europarties let individual members contribute to the 
formulation of policy and vote in leadership contests. On this basis, an index of members’ 
participatory rights is developed. 
 
Direct participation in programmatic decisions 
Europarties publish their manifestos every five years in the build-up to European 
Parliamentary elections. Manifestos are the Europarties’ most high profile and 
comprehensive policy documents and are ratified by the party congress. They guide the 
legislative activities of the Europarties and their associated party groups in the EP (Klüver 
and Rodon 2013). Europarties have different processes in place for writing their manifestos, 
but in general, Europarty officials and member party representatives were the protagonists in 
this process. The member parties tended to let a party official, usually the EU secretary, 
participate in the manifesto writing and checked the final text before giving their green light. 
Sometimes, Members of the European Parliament were included and civil society was 
consulted, as in the case of the EGP (Switek 2015). By formally including individual 
members into the manifesto-writing process, national member parties would yield some of 
their policy-making power to the grassroots.  
It is therefore not surprising that national parties remained in the driving seat when it 
came to writing (and ratifying) Euromanifestos. Only the PES and ALDE have given their 
individual members some limited influence. Ahead of the 2009 European elections, the PES 
decided for the first time to launch an open consultation process that allowed the PES 
activists (but also the trade unions and other actors close to the PES) to send in their written 
contributions – an opportunity that many of them used (Hertner 2011, 333-334). Meanwhile, 
for the 2014 manifesto, ALDE’s individual members elected two conference delegates. These 
attended the 2013 party congress and made amendments to the Euromanifesto, most of which 
were included into the final text (ALDE 3, interview with author). The other Europarties have 
not granted their individual members the opportunity to contribute to their manifestos.   
The PES has introduced another direct way for the activists to shape policy. After the 
2009 European election campaign, in which the PES activists had been very active, the PES 
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presidency adopted a document entitled ‘the PES activists initiative’ which was inspired by 
the concept of the European Citizens Initiative: If 2.5 per cent of PES activists from at least 
15 member parties or affiliated organizations sign a proposal or a comment on policies, the 
initiative is tabled at the PES presidency (PES 2010). Thus, whilst PES activists do not sit on 
high-level working groups - this remains a privilege of national party and PES officials – they 
can have some input in the policy-making process. The PES activists have already initiated 
numerous initiatives. One of them was particularly successful, namely the ‘European Charter 
for a Committed Social Democracy’, parts of which made it into the PES’s 2013 fundamental 
programme. The other Europarties do not allow their individual members to make policy 
proposals.  
Another direct way to participate in Europarty policy-making would be for individual 
members to write their own resolutions. Like some national parties, Europarties issue 
resolutions on topics that matter to them. In the case of the EL, the Council adopts resolutions 
whilst in the cases of the EPP and PES the Presidency adopts them. If individual members 
were allowed to issue their own resolutions on topics that matter to them, this would give 
them influence in shaping policy debates.  
In practice, there is a lot of variation. The EGP’s individual supporters can issue 
resolutions that the party leadership needs to take into consideration, and they can also make 
amendments to the leadership’s policy documents. A former secretary general (EGP 1, 
interview with author) referred to the ‘real agenda-setting power’ of the supporters. Yet, the 
individual supporters have never made use of these rights (Shemer-Kunz 2014). According to 
the ISN’s coordinator (EGP 3, interview with author) the network ‘lacks the organizational 
capacities’ needed to adopt resolutions and amend policy documents. At first, ALDE’s 
individual members were only given the right to make amendments to party resolutions, but 
they did not have the power to write their own resolutions. However, since the 2016 
Congress, individual members have the right to submit their own resolutions. Unsurprisingly, 
the EPP’s individual supporting members have no such rights. Neither do the European Left’s 
individual supporters, although they are regularly asked to contribute to the EL’s newsletter, 
which is an informal way of communicating their positions (EL 1, interview with author). 
Meanwhile, the PES activists can participate informally in PES policy discussions through 
various online platforms. They also have a designated ‘PES Activists Forum’ through which 
they can communicate online. The other Europarties do not grant their individual members 
the right to write resolutions. 
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Delegation and representation 
Like national parties, Europarties could give elected individual members the opportunity to 
participate in the formulation of policy through delegation and representation. To be sure, 
Europarties do not have local or regional branches that could send representatives as 
delegates to party congresses. This remains the prerogative of the member parties. However, 
Europarties could allow selected individual members to attend working group or Council 
meetings alongside member party representatives and thereby give them the opportunity to 
have a say in the party’s day-to-day decisions. 
 Again, there is a large amount of variation between the Europarties. ALDE, for 
instance, has gone furthest by allowing one elected individual member to attend Council 
meetings. The Council is ALDE’s second highest organ and approves membership 
applications, membership fees, the party’s annual budget and accounts, and nominates the 
Secretary General. For an individual member to sit on the Council is an important right. None 
of the other old Europarties have such a system of representation in place. Sometimes, a 
national member party representative sitting on a Europarty committee is also a EGP 
individual supporter or a PES activist, but this is purely coincidental (EGP 3 and PES 6, 
interviews with author). 
Like most national parties, Europarties could also invite selected individual members 
to attend congress. The old Europarties let their congress elect the president and vice-
president (and in some cases also the secretary general), ratify manifestos and other relevant 
policy documents, and approve changes to the party rulebook. By inviting individual 
members to congress, Europarties would include them into the party’s key decisions, debates 
and networks. Europarties could also grant their individual members voting rights. These 
would guarantee some influence. 
The European Greens, Left Party, Socialists all allow their individual members to 
attend their party congress as observers but haven’t granted them voting rights. In case of the 
EGP and PES, while individual members attend the party congress, put up stalls, and 
organize fringe events, they are not allowed to vote. The exception is ALDE, which has a 
system in place whereby for every 500 individual members, one delegate is selected by their 
peers (in an online vote) to attend the party congress. The exact number of delegates matters, 
because in 2015, the ALDE congress gave voting rights to the individual members’ congress 
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delegates. Thus, ALDE has given its individual members the most extensive policy-making 
powers, despite being a latecomer when it came to introducing individual membership.  
 
Vote in leadership elections 
Traditionally, Europarty presidents or chairs were selected and elected by the representatives 
of national member parties at the congress. If they were to follow the example of national 
parties, Europarties should give their individual members the right to participate in leadership 
elections. 
In practice, only ALDE has given a small number of individual members voting rights 
at congress, and therefore, the power to elect the president and vice-president. The other 
Europarties have not opened up their leadership elections to the individual members. 
However, it is worth noting that the EGP held open primaries in the run-up to the 2014 
European elections, which gave individual supporters the opportunity to vote for two 
candidates for the European Commission presidency (the so-called Spitzenkandidaten). Yet, 
as the primaries were open, they can be seen as the EGP’s attempt to be more inclusive and 
reach out to all citizens rather than its registered supporters and members (Put et al. 2016). 
The turnout for the Green primaries was disappointingly low, as merely 22,676 people voted 
(EGP 29/01/2014). The other Europarties did not hold primaries to elect their 
Spitzenkandidaten; instead, their member parties remained the gatekeepers in these contests. 
The PES activists, in particular, were not satisfied with this process. After all, they had 
launched a ‘Campaign for a PES Primary’ in 2010, demanding that the PES’s 
Spitzenkandidat be selected by the members of the PES’s member parties (Campaign for PES 
Primary n.d.). However, the majority of PES member parties objected to holding closed 
primaries, fearing a loss of influence. Thus, when it comes to the selection of leaders, the 
Europarties’ individual members are less influential than many national party members. It 
should also be noted here that the Europarties’ individual members do not have the power to 
select candidates for the European Parliamentary elections; these continue to be selected by 
national parties (Mühlböck 2012). 
Having provided this short overview of the Europarties’ individual members’ 
participation in the formulation of policies and the election of leaders, we can now draw up a 
simple index charting these rights. The number 0 is given to a Europarty that does not grant a 
particular right, whilst the number 1 indicates that a Europarty has granted its individual 
members a particular right. As we consider six participatory rights, the highest score any 
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Europarty can achieve is 6. Table 3 (below) illustrates the findings. Adding the numbers, we 
see that with a score of 5, ALDE has given its individual members the most extensive 
participatory rights. The second and third places are taken by the PES with a score of 4, and 
the EGP, with a score of 3. The other 13 Europarties either do not grant their individual 
members any formal participatory rights (like the EL and EPP), or they have not 
implemented their membership schemes, like the EDP. Unfortunately, the youngest, least 
institutionalized Europarties do not provide any information on their individual membership 
schemes and could not be contacted.  
 
HERE: Table 3: Europarties’ individual members and their participatory rights. 
 
 
5. Why such variation?    
Europarties have introduced membership for individuals under very different terms and 
conditions. For a start, the registration procedures vary between the parties. Whilst the 
majority of Europarties offer direct individual membership and registration, the PES and the 
EGP only allow members of their full member parties to join them, which creates a type of 
indirect Europarty membership.  
More importantly for this study, Europarties offer their individual members very 
different participatory rights. ALDE’s individual membership scheme comes closest do what 
Scarrow (2015) calls ‘traditional individual membership’ of a national party: members have 
to sign a declaration outlining the party’s principles; they pay annual dues; and they have 
some say in the party’s key decisions. Meanwhile, the PES has the highest number of 
activists and a lively community spreading across Europe, but the PES activists’ scheme is 
only a type of ‘light membership’, as the formal powers of the activists remain very weak. 
The same applies to the European Greens who have given their individual supporters few 
formal rights apart from the possibility to adopt resolutions. Light membership is a second-
class membership. The other Europarties do not allow their individual members to participate 
in the making of policies or the selection of leaders. What the EPP and EL offer individuals 
could be thought of as ‘cyber-membership’ (Scarrow 2015, 30): they are formally registered 
party supporters who, however, do not enjoy any formal rights. This variation can be 
explained by looking at four interlinked factors, each of which will be explained in turn.  
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The Europarties’ electoral successes 
One obvious explanation for the differences in membership schemes is the parties’ changing 
electoral fortunes. It has been observed that national parties, after losing elections, have an 
incentive to initiate organizational reforms and go to some length to recruit new members 
(Bolleyer 2009).  Similar behaviour can be observed for Europarties. The EPP launched its 
supporting membership during the 1990s when its European election results were modest. 
However, as the EPP performed well in the following three European Parliamentary elections 
and was also well represented in the other EU institutions, the expansion of its individual 
membership scheme was not a priority. Meanwhile, the PES introduced their activist scheme 
in 2005 after two consecutive defeats in the 1999 and 2004 European parliamentary elections. 
The launch of the PES activists can be interpreted as an attempt to mobilize party members 
and generate electoral support at a time of soul-searching. After what was seen as another 
disappointing electoral result, in 2009, the powers of the PES activists were slightly extended. 
ALDE introduced individual membership after the other major Europarties, and granted its 
individual members more extensive political powers at a time when its electoral fortunes 
were shrinking. From 100 seats in the 2004 European Parliamentary elections, the ALDE 
group went down to 70 seats in 2014. Thus, both the PES and ALDE’s introduction of 
individual membership needs to be understood as an attempt to gain more grassroots 
supporters and voters at a time of waning electoral success. 
 
The attitudes of national member parties towards individual membership 
If the old and established Europarties wanted to grant their individual members important 
rights, then they would need the approval of their member parties. For some Europarties, the 
opposition of their member parties was impossible to overcome. For example, when former 
PES president Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, together with Secretary General Philip Cordery, 
initiated the launch of the PES activists in 2004, his original plans were bolder than the final 
outcome. He had wanted to introduce direct individual membership. Yet, some of the PES’ 
member parties were against this idea, most notably those from Central and Eastern Europe 
(Skrzypek 2013). The ‘PES activists’ scheme, as it exists today, was therefore a compromise 
between the new PES leadership and the member parties. A PES official explains: 
 
The activists have become more complex and autonomous, and they have adopted 
their own structures. The member parties are generally more positive about them 
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now than they were a few years ago […]. Enhancing their rights is a difficult 
question. The activists are looking for more, that’s inevitable. The PES message 
is: if you want more rights, you need to work closely with the member parties. 
(PES 3, interview with author) 
 
Meanwhile, a leading PES activist also writes about ‘the unwillingness of the national parties, 
but also the PES, to let the activist movement become too independent’ (Der [europäische] 
Föderalist 24/03/2016). 
Equally, many national green parties were suspicious of the individual supporters’ 
scheme. This is best illustrated by a statement that appeared on the European Greens’ 
individual supporters network website, which highlights that the introduction of individual 
membership was controversial:  
 
Some EGP member parties turned out to have serious doubts about the idea, 
fearing that individuals might undermine their position within the EGP, or that 
political enemies might join en masse through the European door and harm their 
position back home. Others were afraid that energy put into European action 
would sap forces needed for their own programme. And yet others, the majority, 
were simply not interested or put the issue at the bottom of their priority list. 
(Individual Supporters Network n.d.) 
 
Thus, in the case of the PES and EGP, the opposition of member parties remains difficult to 
overcome. This is for two main reasons. First, they fear a loss of influence inside the 
Europarty’s decision-making bodies, where so far they were able to veto all the important 
decisions about policy, strategy, and personnel. Second, some member parties are concerned 
that the Europarties’ individual members might develop parallel grassroots organizations. 
Especially some of the oldest, largest, and most powerful national parties see this as 
problematic. 
In the case of ALDE, it was a dynamic leadership team made up of secretary general 
Federica Sabbati and president Graham Watson that introduced individual membership in an 
effort to create a ‘real party’ with real members. A big push also came from some ALDE 
Bureau members who had formally been active in the party’s youth wing, LYMEC. The latter 
had already introduced individual membership in the late 1990s, so a blueprint already 
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existed. Still, some national member parties needed to be persuaded of the benefits of 
individual membership. As a steering committee member put it, ‘horse trading’ took place: 
the individual members supported the candidacy of certain Bureau members, and these 
candidates, in return, offered the individual members their support (ALDE 4, interview with 
author). Thus, without the strong support of Europarty leaders and the agreement of the 
member parties, individual membership schemes would not have been introduced or 
enhanced. This, however, is not to say that the individual members themselves played no role 
in this process.  
 
The individual members’ activism  
The individual members’ themselves have played a key role in enhancing their powers. Most 
notably, ALDE’s individual members have their own, elected and well-organized steering 
committee in place that manages their activities. The steering committee has fought for its 
recognition and empowerment with the ALDE Bureau and some member parties, and 
continues to do so. Having achieved representation at the party congress and voting rights, 
their next aim is to administer their own budget – a power that currently lies with ALDE’s 
Bureau. What might help is the fact that the individual members are net financial contributors 
to ALDE’s shrinking budget. In 2016, the individual members brought in over €15,000 which 
is more money than a small ALDE member party pays as their annual membership fee 
(ALDE 4, interview with author). Thus, it was a mix of organizational skills and financial 
resources that has empowered the individual members.   
The PES activists have also fought for more recognition, and ultimately, voting rights at 
the party congress. For instance, the PES activists coordinator for Germany explains: 
 
All PES activists think that it should be a real individual membership, that the 
activists shouldn’t have to be members of national parties. The PES introduced 
the activists in order to enhance its legitimacy, but it opened a Pandora’s Box: the 
activists are a well-established network now (…). And they want more rights. The 
right to vote in the party congress. They have started a petition asking for voting 
rights and might even go on a strike before the next European elections if they are 
not given that right. (PES 5, interview with author) 
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Despite such ambitions, the activists’ lobbying for more power has not been successful. Part 
of the explanation is that the PES activists do not have their own, elected steering committee. 
Instead, their activities are coordinated by the PES secretariat in Brussels. Additionally, the 
PES activists don’t hold financial powers as the PES doesn’t charge membership fees. Some 
of the more ambitious activists have already lost confidence in the PES and its member 
parties’ willingness ‘to create a pan-European grassroots movement. We missed that 
opportunity, and the vibes are gone now’, as a long-standing PES activist and founder of a 
PES City Group deplores (PES 6, interview with author). The European Greens’ individual 
supporters also wanted to enhance their participatory powers but found it very difficult to 
convince the member parties. It appears that, for the PES activists and the Green supporters, 
the momentum for change got lost when they ran against a brick wall of national parties’ 
opposition. The individual members of the other Europarties have not yet shown signs of 
revolting. 
 
Party funding rules 
Another factor explaining why some Europarties have and others have not introduced 
individual membership, and why some have given their individual members participatory 
powers and some have not done so, is party funding rules. In order to be eligible to apply for 
EU funding, Europarties currently need to be represented - in at least one quarter of the 
member states – by members of the European Parliament, of national parliaments, or of 
regional parliaments. Or, a Europarty or its member parties must have received, in at least 
one quarter of EU member states, at least three per cent of the votes cast at the most recent 
EU elections. 
Most Europarties live of the funds provided by the European Parliament and, to a 
much lesser extent, of the fees paid by their member parties. The EP’s funds are distributed 
among the Europarties according to a set scale that benefits the parties with the highest 
number of seats in the EP. Thus, those Europarties with many MEPs and large, fee-paying 
member parties, such as the EPP, do not rely on the dues paid by individual members for 
their survival. By contrast, some of the newer Europarties have zero or very few MEPs and 
member parties. For the Coalition for Life and Family, for instance, having individual 
members is currently the only means to register as a Europarty and receive EU funding. Yet, 
while natural persons can join these parties, it appears that their individual members are all 
elected politicians. These have full voting rights at the congress because they are the only 
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party members. This explains why right-wing populist Europarties, such as the European 
Alliance for Freedom, are - at least in the short term - not concerned with mobilizing the 
grassroots but with receiving EU funds in order to build up the party.   
 
6. Concluding discussion 
Studying Europarties and their grassroots links matters at a time when the European Union is 
increasingly perceived as a distant bureaucratic machine that is governed by a broad political 
consensus rather than ideologically distinct parties. For this purpose, this article has described 
and compared the Europarties’ individual membership schemes. More specifically, it has 
investigated the rights given to individual members and developed a participatory index. In 
doing so, this research has highlighted two main findings.  
First, the Europarties’ individual membership schemes appear as diverse as those of 
national parties. Most notably, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats is the only Europarty 
to have given its individual members the right to vote at the party congress, where manifestos 
are ratified and party leaders elected. ALDE’s individual membership therefore comes closest 
to that of ‘traditional’ (national) party membership. Meanwhile, the European Socialists and 
the Greens offer their individual members some participation, but very few formal rights. In 
fact, their individual members are ‘light’ members. They could also be thought of as 
campaigners, activists, or supporters rather than members – as their names (PES activists, 
EGP individual supporters) suggest. The other Europarties show little signs of developing a 
real grassroots membership, mainly due to a lack of interest and/or organizational resources.   
Second, this article has found that despite the introduction of individual membership, 
Europarties essentially remain élite-driven organizations. Although some Europarties have 
given their individual members a limited say in the formulation of policy, it is the national 
parties who remain the key players when it comes to writing Europarty manifestos and other 
policy documents, and selecting Europarty leaders. The power struggles of the PES activists 
and EGP individual supporters reveal that many national parties refuse to share their power 
with individual members. The member parties also remain in charge of selecting candidates 
for European Parliamentary elections and for running their own election campaigns. As long 
as the Europarties’ individual members cannot stand for elections, they will never be seen as 
fully-fledged party members. Hence, for the time being, national parties don’t seem to be 
willing to give up their status as gatekeepers of party activism in Europe.  
If Europarties want to become ‘real’ parties, they will need ‘real’ members in the 
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future. In order to attract and keep more individual members, Europarties should grant them 
stronger participatory rights (Bressanelli 2014, 171). After all, why would highly motivated 
activists give their time generously to a party that denies them a say in the important 
decisions and denies them candidacy? This puzzle would be worth investigating. One future 
line of inquiry would be to examine the motives, expectations, attitudes, behaviour, and 
background of the Europarties’ individual members. It would be interesting to find out what 
drives individual members to mobilize at the EU level when the benefits of Europarty 
membership remain so limited.  
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